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ABSTRACT 
A high-level anomaly recovery plan which identifies 
the steps necessary to recover from a spacecraft 
"Safing" incident was developed for the Galileo 
spacecraft prior to launch. Since launch, a total of 
four in-flight anomalies have lead to entry into a 
system fault protection "Safing" routine which has 
required the Galileo flight team to refine and execute 
the recovery plan. These failures have allowed the 
flight team to develop an efficient recovery process 
when permanent spacecraft capability degradation is 
minimal and the cause of the anomaly is quickly 
diagnosed. With this previous recovery experience 
and the very focused boundary conditions of a 
specific potential failure, a Gaspra asteroid recovery 
plan was designed to be implemented in as quickly as 
forty hours (desired goal). 
This paper documents the work performed above, 
however, the Galileo project remains challenged to 
develop a generic detailed recovery plan which can be 
implemented in a relatively short time to configure 
the spacecraft to a nominal state prior to future high 
priority mission objectives. 
Key Words: Recovery plan, safing, system fault 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Galileo Project is an investigative mission 
undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to acquire, process, and 
analyze scientific data obtained from the Jovian 
system. 
1.1 The Galileo Spacecraft and Mission 
The Galileo spacecraft (Figure 1) was launched on 
board the Space Shuttle Atlantis and injected into its 
Venus-Earth-Earth Gravity Assist trajectory by a two- 
stage Inertial Upper Stage on October 18, 1989. On 
October 29, 1991 an opportunity of historical 
significance manifested itself with the first ever flyby 
of an asteroid (Gaspra) by a man-made spacecraft. 
Another flyby of a second asteroid (Ida) on August 28, 
way to acquire and k scientific data on the 
Jovian atmosphere. 
into an orbit around Jupiter to perform an intensive 
twenty-two month scientific investigation of the 
Jovian system (the planet, its major satellites, and its 
extensive magneto-sphere). The science investigations 
will be conducted through the use of four remote 
sensing and six fields and particles science 
instruments mounted on the Orbiter. 
figure 1 The Galileo Spacecraft 
1.2 Sequence Development and Verification 
Normally, the spacecraft is controlled and operated 
through the execution of Nonpriviledged Memory 
Sequence Loads (NMSLs). The duration of each of 
these sequence loads, used to implement mission 
activities, may last from a few days to many weeks 
depending upon mission objectives. Development of 
the NMSL begins with the activities defined in the 
Galileo Mission Plan which is used to create a detailed 
timeline of events. This timeline includes all internal 
and external resources for execution of the sequence 
load including timing, ground station allocations, and 
spacecraft monitoring periods. This resulting timeline 
is called the Cruise Plan (CP), and takes 
approximately six weeks to develop. Expansion of 
the CP is accomplished by specifying the detailed 
parameters and options of the spacecraft blocks, 
resulting in a detailed time ordered listing of the 
commands needed to execute the sequenced activities. 
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This listing is designated the Profile Design (PD) 
product and its development typically takes four 
weeks. The PD product is then converted to the 
actual NMSL via a sequence translation program and 
a ground command file is created for uplink to the 
spacecraft. This phase of the development usually 
takes another four weeks. 
To accommodate unplanned activities or respond to 
anomalies real time corn 
time command development process can vary from 
minutes or several days depending on command 
sequence complexity and urgency. 
Validation of the NMSLs are accomplished via 
manual reviews and software constraint checking of 
activity plans, command sequence files, and sequence 
of events listings. Final command sequence 
verification is primarily performed on the Galieo Test 
Bed, a facility comprised of flight hardware and 
software: The prime subsystems comprising the test 
bed are Command Data Subsystem (CDS) and the 
Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS). 
Test bed operations provide the detailed command 
execution and timing verification which is difficult to 
ensure just by manual inspection by engineering 
analysts. 
1.3 System Fault Protection Safing Routine 
Under some anomalous conditions, faults may place 
the Orbiter or Probe in jeopardy. To ensure Orbiter 
and Probe system health and safety, the Orbiter is 
equipped with autonomous System Fault Protection 
(SFP). SFP responds with a pre-determined set of 
commands to safe the spacecraft. The Safing response 
specifically established for the interplanetary cruise 
phase is designed to: 
* 
* 
* 
Terminate the active NMSL to prevent unwanted 
interference with the Safing response. 
Cycle electrical loads off/on to establish a sufficient 
power margin and be thermally safe. 
Locate the remote science platform to a safe position to 
protect light sensitive instruments from the sun and 
thruster plume contaminants. 
Ensure commandability and telemetry according to 
mission phase dependent requirements. 
* 
The Safing response is accomplished in two parts. 
Safig-1 halts the NMSL and switch off most non- 
Safig critical switchable electrical loads. Safing-1 
places a message in telemetry to alert the flight team 
of the safiig event. Safing-1 ends with a request to 
initiate Safing-2. Safing-2 establishes a known, safe 
quiescent state to enable key functions. Safing-2 first 
halts all AACS tasks except for periodic benign sun 
acquisitions. Next the telecommunications state is 
12 hours will continue, thereby causing the spacecraft 
ts track the sun. 
Special cruise phase specific instrument safing, 
commands may be 
r establish a safe and 
1.4 Pre-Launch Safing Recovery Plan 
A recovery contingency plan was developed pre- 
launch. Based on the SFP autonomous responses and 
the plan outlines a process guiding a 
recovery. The flow of this generalized 
recovery is as follows: 
* 
Recognize that SFP has been invoked and, if in safing, 
the exact time the NMSL was aborted 
Identify and immediately correct safety threatening 
conditions on the spacecraft. 
Determine exact state of the spacecraft at the time of 
SFP entry, following the spacecraft's autonomous 
response, and at the projected sequence restart point. 
Establish cause of the anomaly and correct any 
persistent fault condition or implement work-arounds 
for any reduction in spacecraft capabilities. 
Implement spacecraft reconfiguration to the selected 
sequence restart state. 
Restart aborted sequence or next sequence at its 
designated load boundary. 
* 
* 
However, the plan did not try to be specific, 
recognizing the following uncertainties: 
What is the nature of the anomaly causing entry 
into the safing routine and what corrective action 
or work arounds are necessary? 
What was the specific state of the spacecraft at 
the time of the anomaly? 
What is the desired state of the spacecraft 
following recovery and resumption of the 
nominal operations? 
Establishing comprehensive reconfiguration 
command files or stored sequence restart points 
which provide opportunities to bring the spacecraft 
back up to specified states was deemed not practical. 
A large number of contingency files would have to be 
generated and significant sequencing memory space 
would have to be reserved for establishing restart 
points. The latter presented a memory management 
difficulty for CDS software analysts. In addition, the 
cause of an anomaly and fix/workarounds cannot be 
pre-determined and may negate any pre-generated 
reconfiguration files and/or restart points in the 
sequence. Therefore, a predetermined and complete 
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generic safing recovery contingency plan for any 
anomaly had been determined a feasible. However, 
assuming a specific failure, the state of the spacecraft 
at the time of an anomaly and at a specific restart 
point, a rapid recovery could be realized. 
2. FIRST SAFING INCIDENT 
During the final few weeks of the Earth-Venus leg of 
the mission, the spacecraft was being commanded via 
a sequence load -5. An AACS Star 
Scanner (SS) calib during the previous 
sequence, did not produce all the desired results. 
Another attempt was then planned for the EV-5 time 
frame to be executed via real time commands and in 
parallel with the EV-5 sequence. 
2.1 System Fault Protection Safing 
Early in the morning on Day Of Year (DOY) 90-015, 
downlinked AACS telemetry data indicated that an 
attitude estimate-related fault had occurred during 
the previous evening, and that an autonomous abort 
had brought the subsystem from inertial (Gyro-based 
attitude estimate) to cruise mode (celestial-based 
attitude estimate). After much deliberation, the flight 
team decided to proceed with the transmission of the 
SS calibration real-time commands even though the 
assumed spacecraft initial state had changed. It was 
believed that data gathered during the calibration 
may give some insight into the fault occurrence. 
Shortly after the start of the activity, AACS analysts 
observed that the clock controller was experiencing 
difficulty in maintaining control (position and rate) of 
the Spin Bearing Assembly (SBA). After some time, 
AACS SBA-related fault monitors began to trip, 
eventually leading to an AACS Power On Reset 
(POR). This resulted in SFP canceling the EV-5 
sequence and requesting spacecraft safing. With the 
sequence recovery contingency plan in hand, the 
flight team embarked on a effort that would test the 
generalized flow defined pre-launch. 
2.2 Anomaly Diagnosis 
Following verification of all AACS telemetry 
measurements, AACS analysts set off to recreate the 
anomaly on the test bed. Using cruise mode as the 
initial state, the analysts observed similar behavior 
and trips of the same SBA-related fault monitors as 
observed in flight. Based on these findings and 
detailed investigative study, a preliminary theory into 
the cause of the anomaly was developed within hours 
of the flight incident. The cause of the problem was 
attributable to a then unknown idiosyncrasy with the 
AACS Right Software (FSW) attempting to maintain a 
celestial pointing SBA scan type in cruise mode 
without celestial attitude reference available. Without 
system. No degradation of 
2.3 Recovery and Return to Nominal Operations 
To ensure telemetry and thermal safety, real-time 
commands were sent within hours of the safing 
incident to reconfigure the telecommunication 
downlink data rate and propulsion thermal state. 
Following diagnosis of the anomaly and verifying that 
no degradation of spacecraft capabilities occurred, the 
top priority of the flight team was to return the 
spacecraft to the correct configuration for 
transmission and execution of the EV-6 sequence, 
which contained considerably important Venus 
encounter science activities. The flight team 
deliberately chose to follow the generalized flow of 
the recovery plan in a prudent and systematic 
manner, so as not to jeopardize the Venus science 
encounter activities. 
Although there was a goal to salvage as much of the 
canceled EV-5 sequence as possible, this was not 
feasible due to lack of sun-pointed stars needed for 
reacquiring celestial reference. Since no sun-pointed 
star sets were available until after the planned final 
attitude update in EV-5; none of the sequence was 
salvaged. Consequently, all necessary engineering 
activities scheduled for execution during the latter 
portion of the sequence were performed via real-time 
commands, adding to the flight team's work load. In 
addition, the first two days of the EV-6 sequence was 
truncated to allow time for required engineering and 
science subsystem reconfiguration activities. On DOY 
90-037, twenty-three days following the anomaly the 
shortened EV-6 sequence was successfully 
transmitted to the spacecraft and executed nominally. 
Having taken a prudent and systematic approach, the 
flight team had an opportunity to verify the 
generalized recovery process. This gave the flight 
team confidence in knowing that if future anomalies 
occur, the flight team would have available a tested 
contingency plan for reference. 
3. SUBSEQUENT SAFING INCIDENTS 
As noted earlier the Galileo spacecraft has 
experienced four entries into Safing to date. The 
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recent three entries have all been caused by the same 
condition. This condition was caused by one of the 
two redundant CDS operating strings detecting a 
despun CDS POR, causing this to "shut down" 
after informing the other string using this other 
string to initiate spacecraft safing. Each of the despun 
CDS POR events have been spurious transients and 
not a "hard failure. The CDS POR indications are 
believed to be caused by momentary debris induced 
electrical "shorts" in the SBA interface. 
The three CDS POR anomalies have occurred as 
follows: 
91-085/1331:18 SCE CDS B String POR 
* 91-123/05:2651 SCE CDS A String POR 
0 91-201/02:09:00 SCE CDS A String POR 
3.1 CDS POR Diagnosis and Recovery Planning 
A recovery team comprised of representatives from 
the flight team was assembled. The recovery approach 
followed the outline given here: 
e Ensure the spacecraft state is known, stable, and per 
predicts , including telecommunication telemetry link 
performance. 
Provide a preliminary assessment of the anomaly cause 
and autonomous actions taken. 
Collect more detailed diagnostic data and an analytical 
assessment of the anomaly. 
Establish project prioritized goals and guidelines for 
spacecraft recovery. 
Develop an integrated flight team recovery plan. 
Implement the recovery plan systematically and 
prudently and using standard Project procedures and 
reviews of each action. 
The recovery process was broken into two major 
activities, recovery of the CDS from its POR state 
followed by recovery of the spacecraft from its Safing 
commanded state. Since the anomaly was transient 
and the SFP response was pre-dominantly within the 
CDS, the CDS analysts and FSW engineers lead the 
activity to diagnose the cause of the POR event and 
define the process for safety restoring both the CDS 
strings to their pre-anomaly status. 
The other major activity was to identify the target 
date to resume normal sequence activities, identify 
activities lost during the recovery time frame and 
reschedule these as needed. Also to be planned were 
any required spacecraft maintenance activities and 
spacecraft reconfiguring events to put the spacecraft 
in the required state for the targeted sequence restart 
point. 
Detailed project prioritized list of recovery goals and 
guidelines were established as follows: 
Maintain spacecraft health and safety throughout the 
recovery period and minimize risk of additional faults 
e of 
ty to pre-safing state. 
Restoration of the CDS shall be accomplish at the 
earliest, practical time using all relevant and establish 
project procedure and guidelines. 
Establish a spacecraft state to the correct configuration 
nominal NMSL at the 
an 
ect 
approval and shall be used to direct the recovery 
process. 
Unique, non-standard, and first time spacecraft 
activities must be simulated on the test bed prior to 
uplinking to the spacecraft or project must specifically 
waive the need to do so. 
Recovery activities shall be real-time commanded using 
immediate executable commands or accomplished by 
mini-stored sequence of commands - all standard real- 
time commands or sequence review checks and 
procedure shall be used to validate all command files. 
The targeted restart sequence shall be simulated 
relative to the CDS and spacecraft states. 
3.2 CDS POR Recovery Activities and Schedules 
A full spacecraft recovery plan was devised for the 
DOY 91-085 anomaly which lasted thirty-one calendar 
days. The targeted restart point was selected based 
on the time the project felt was needed to safely 
implement each of the required recovery activities 
and to resume the next planned sequence. Stored 
sequence resumption is important to not burden the 
flight team with real-time commanding the spacecraft. 
The plan included the required CDS reconfiguration, 
spacecraft maintenaqce activity (normally 
implemented out of the stored sequence), missed 
activities from the aborted sequence, and 
reconfiguration of the spacecraft to the target restart 
point. The restart point reconfiguration included 
reconfiguring telecommunications for Engineering 
High Rate [EHR, 1200 Bits Per Second (BPS)], the 
High Gain Antenna (HGA) deploy mini-sequence, re- 
initializing celestial attitude reference, establishing the 
proper power state of the spacecraft and adjusting the 
spacecraft attitude for the new sequence. [Unrelated 
to the CDS anomaly, the HGA deploy sequence failed 
to deploy the HGA.] 
Again, the area of the ecliptic plane in which the 
spacecraft had been following the sun did not yield 
many star sets for reacquiring celestial reference, a 
pre-requisite for returning to nominal spacecraft 
command sequencing control. This again caused 
many required spacecraft activities to be performed 
via real-time commands. Command and control with 
this method has been found to be taxing to the flight 
team as a whole. 
The CDS POR recovery caused the greatest concern of 
the recovery process, since it was a never before 
executed activity on the spacecraft and required 
cleaning up a number 
associated with the CDS 
components. The CDS recove 
phases: 
Phase 1: Error analysis and isolation which 
provided for detailed tel 
isolated the down 
reconfigura tion. 
Phase 2: Reconfiguration and initialization of the 
down string CDS to establish a state compatible with 
the processor restart. 
Phase 3: Restart the down string processor, 
synchronize the timing between the two CDS 
processors and verify proper CDS processing. 
Phase 4: Restore and clean-up remaining control 
flags, telemetry indicators and SFP parameters. 
The Project was understandably cautious in 
implementing each of the phases above, because of 
the criticality and complexity of the CDS recovery. 
This part of the recovery alone was spread over 
thirteen days to allow for complete verification of 
each phase before committing to the next phase. 
The second CDS POR anomaly, DOY 91-123, was 
similar to the first except that the prime CDS string 
detected the CDS POR indication. Since normally the 
engineering telemetry is processed and telemetered 
through the telecommunications subsystem over the 
prime string, telemetry was lost as the prime CDS 
string shut down and the back-up CDS string ran the 
safing algorithms. This was a previously recognized 
problem with the SFP in that it does not reconfigure 
the CDS or the telecommunications interface to allow 
the back-up CDS telemetry to be downlinked. The 
initial reaction on the ground following the anomaly 
was that a ground station problem had prevented 
proper lock up of the telemetry signal. However, 
after a review of the SFP and CDS codes it was 
determined that the anomaly was again a CDS POR 
but this time on the prime string. Real-time 
commands were soon processed and transmitted to 
select the back-up CDS processor for telemetry 
downlink. 
The second CDS POR anomaly recovery followed the 
same guidelines and approach as the first. The CDS 
recovery time for this anomaly was reduced from 
thirteen days to seven days. This was accomplished, 
because less time was included in the schedule 
between CDS recovery phases. This was permitted by 
the Project management once it was determined the 
anomaly was the same as previously experienced and 
the recovery process was analogous. 
recovery command 
recovery phases for reconfiguring, restarting and 
cleaning up of the CDS processors. 
It should be noted that during the period of time that 
the second and third CDS POR anomalies occurred, 
the Galileo Project was working hard to diagnose and 
correct the HGA non-deployment anomaly. To 
maximize flexibility of the flight team and to preclude 
interruption of a stored sequence during this period, 
the spacecraft was not executing a NMSL. Therefore 
the spacecraft recovery following the CDS POR was to 
essentially reconfigure to a back-ground cruise state. 
4. AACS Recovery Issues 
To significantly reduce the impact caused by the 
unavailability of star sets for future celestial reference 
acquisitions following an anomaly, the flight team 
investigated the possibility of altering the SFP 
response to a POR. Instead of unconditionally com- 
manding a sun-point from spacecraft safing every 12 
hours and possibly losing celestial reference for some 
considerable time period, a check or conditional 
would first be performed. If celestial reference were 
available at the time of the anomaly and AACS 
indicated an "earth acquired" status, then the 
spacecraft attitude would remain unchanged (no 
unconditional sun-point). In a purely technical sense, 
earth acquired means that the spacecraft HGA is 
pointed directly towards the earth within some given 
error tolerance. With the wide range of commanded 
spacecraft attitudes planned for HGA anomaly 
resolution purposes (cool turns and warm turns) and 
the risk of future CDS Despun POR indications, the 
flight team's challenge was how to convince the 
spacecraft that is was always earth-pointed, 
regardless of the actual spacecraft attitude. AACS 
analysts determined that all that was required for the 
"earth acquired status to be set was to have celestial 
reference available and to have the AACS FSW track 
an earth vector. Data contained in the earth vector 
slot did not have to be related to spacecraft-relative 
earth motion (i.e. could represent the motion of the 
sun). All that the AACS FSW was concerned about 
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was that it was directed to follow motion parameters 
with the label “earth vector”. This change in operating 
strategy has since been implemented. 
The previous S/C safing events taught us that a quick 
recovery can be realized if three things are known or 
planned before the anomaly occurs: 
1. 
2. 
The probable cause and autonomous response of 
the spacecraft are known. 
The recovery actions correcting the cause and 
establishing a normal spacecraft state are known 
beforehand and command files are pre- 
generated. 
A specific planned sequence restart point is 
targeted and the state of the spacecraft at this 
point is established beforehand 
3. 
6. GASPRA ENCOUNTER CONTINGENCY 
Following the three CDS POR events the Galileo 
Project had an opportunity to take the events and 
plan a contingency recovery plan to protect the 
mission unique Gaspra Encounter. Given the SBA 
debris theory causing the CDS POR it was considered 
a real threat to spuriously re-occur prior to the Gaspra 
encounter scheduled for DOY 91-301. Since the SIT 
autonomous response had been well characterized it 
was possible to pre-generate the required command 
files to correct and restart the CDS state. Looking 
ahead at the Gaspra sequence designated EE-3’, it was 
possible to determine the exact state the spacecraft 
had to be in at the start of EE-3’. Thus, a detailed 
contingency recovery plan could be made such that 
the duration of the recovery could be minimized. 
Figure 2 shows a recovery timeline based on the time 
relative to the occurrence of the POR. Including pad 
this timeline could be accomplished in as quickly as 
forty hours for full CDS and S/C recovery, quite a 
reduction from the twenty-three and thirty-one day 
recoveries of the first two anomalies. It must be noted 
without question that the forty hour implementation 
time was considered only a desired (best case). 
The Galileo project office reserved the right to dictate 
how fast the flight team should actually implement 
the spacecraft recovery task. The recovery timeliie 
was to be implemented in the following fashion: 
e Identification and confirmation of the anomaly. 
e Perform CDS POR recovery and restart. 
* Regeneration, if required, of the spacecraft 
reconfiguration com-mand files based on the actual 
state of the spacecraft at the time the anomaly occurred. 
Reconfigure the engineering subsystems to the Gaspra 
sequence initial states. 
Turn on and configure the instruments for the Gaspra 
science activities. 
* 
e 
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Figure 2 Gaspra Recovery Timeline 
7. LESSONS LEARNED 
Obviously recovery time from any anomaly is 
dependent on the cause of the anomaly and any 
degradation of the spacecraft capabilities following 
resolution of the anomaly. From the four cases of 
safing the Galileo spacecraft has experienced, the 
duration of fault identification to recovery of the fault 
was reduced from greater than four weeks to inside a 
week. Experience has shown that familiarity with the 
cause of the anomaly and its required recovery plan 
can significantly reduce recovery time. In addition, 
establishing a recovery approach following 
prioritized goals and guidelines lead to expedient, 
yet safe recovery. 
8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank our colleagues who were 
previously and are currently involved with Galileo in- 
flight operations. Also, we would like to 
acknowledge the encouragement and direction the 
recovery planning team received from the Galileo 
Project Office which made it possible to develop and 
commit to an aggressive and rapid recovery plan to 
have in place for the Gaspra encounter. 
This work was performed at the 3et Propulsion 
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under 
contract with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 
208 
